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Looking Back: Three Decades of Instability and Crises 
Over the past 30 years, Turkey has been governed by 22 governments, while 
macroeconomic and political instability became a major feature of the country. 
Populist macroeconomic policies, moral hazard problems, huge public sector deficits, 
high real interest rates, overvalued Turkish lira, strong currency substitution, large 
current account deficits, volatile short-term international capital flows, extremely risk-
taking behavior of banks, volatile economic growth, and high and persistent inflation 
resulted in several successive crises in the real and financial sectors in Turkey (see 
Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2002). 
In Turkey, the financial sector is traditionally dominated by banking activities, and the 
banking sector experienced several systemic crises since late 1970s, as also shown in 
Figure 1. In early 1980, in response to a strong balance-of-payments crisis 
accompanied by a deep recession and accelerated inflation, Turkey abandoned its 
inward-oriented development strategy and gradually started to introduce free-market 
based reforms. To liberalize the repressed domestic financial system, many 
restrictions on domestic and external financial intermediation have been removed, or 
at least minimized, between 1980 and 1989. The early domestic financial 
liberalization attempt between 1980 and 1982 failed as a result of (i) the strong 
competition between banks and broker houses in interest rates, and (ii) missing 
regulations towards strengthening the legal fundamentals of banking sector in Turkey. 
In 1982, five banks, along with many brokerage houses, were liquidated. During the 
whole liberalization process in the 1980s, however, the number of banks increased 
from 43 in 1980 to 66 in 1990, while the number of their branches climbed from 5954 
to 6560 with an accommodating rise in number of employees from 125312 persons to 
154089 persons within the same period (see Figure 2 and 3). As a result, the number 
of branches per bank decreased from 138 in 1980 to 99 in 1990, with no significant 
changes in the number of employees per branch (see Figure 2). Meanwhile, between 
1980 and 1990, the number of foreign banks in Turkey increased from 4 to 23. 
Opening of the Turkish economy to the rest of the world in the 1980s increased 
certainly the funding options abroad both for the financial system and large 
corporations. However, it also increased the vulnerability of the domestic economy to 
external shocks. After 1989, the overvaluation of the Turkish lira and high domestic 
interest rates on government bonds attracted short-term capital inflows into Turkey. 
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The so-called hot-money mechanism, which was driven mainly by external open 
positions of Turkish banks, created a deep currency and banking crisis in early 1994 
because it turned out that this mechanism was not sustainable anymore. Between 1994 
and 1999, the number of banks increased from 67 to 81, while number of bank 
branches climbed from 6087 to 7691 causing an employment rise from 139046 
persons to 173988 persons. The 1994 financial crisis resulted in a lower credit rating 
of Turkey and a general pessimism about the economy, and hence, many small banks 
found it difficult to raise funds abroad. Therefore, they were forced to increase their 
branch networks in order to collect more deposits. 
Between 1995 and 1997, both the continuing failure of governments in disinflating the 
economy and the re-emergence of the so-called hot-money policy were 
accommodated by the repeated excessive risk-taking behavior of the banking sector. 
Even after the currency and banking crisis of 1994, many (mostly smaller) banks 
continued to abandon traditional banking activities in favor of using their funds to 
purchase government securities. 
Following the 1994 crisis the government introduced a full deposit insurance system 
(both for foreign and domestic currency savings accounts), which contributed 
significantly to arising moral hazard problems in the banking sector, while the 
government was placing weakened banks on the Treasury’s surveillance list for poor 
financial status and exhibited an unwillingness to close them. The number of listed 
banks climbed to 15 between 1985 and 1999, and hence, many banks abandoned 
sound banking practices and their financial conditions started to deteriorate around 
1997. By the end of the 1990s, the sole function of the financial system in Turkey was 
nearly reduced to transferring funds from the domestic and international markets to 
the Treasury (Denizer et al., 2000). During the 1990s, most of the new domestic entry 
into the banking sector was from large industrial conglomerates founding their own 
banks, since the poor regulatory structure allowed for large amounts of lending from 
the banks to in-group companies (Denizer et al., 2000, and Damar, 2004). Beside that, 
illegal activities in the Turkish banking sector also increased in the late 1990s. 
Meanwhile, the number of state-owned banks in the sector diminished from 12 in 
1980 to 8 in 1990, and then to 4 in 1999. In the late 1990s, bad macroeconomic 
policies of governments, along with excessive risk-taking preferences of banks, 
reverted the direction of financial liberalization of the 1980s back to the situation in 
the late 1970s, which was characterized by an “over-branched” and “over-staffed” 
banking system (Zaim, 1995, and Akçay, 2001). 
As a combined result of (i)  bad investment and production decisions of domestic 
industrialists, (ii) connected lending and (iii) illegal activities in the banking sector, 
the weight of non-performing loans on banks’ portfolios significantly increased, 
especially after 1997. Meanwhile, increasing foreign open positions of banks was an 
indication of rising exchange-rate risk in the system. In early 1999, the banking 
system was very fragile to a systemic crisis. In 1999, the State Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF) took over six insolvent banks, using the authority given to it in 1994 
when full deposit insurance was introduced. 
By December 1999, the government introduced a three-year (2000-2002) disinflation 
and macroeconomic restructuring program, which was essentially an exchange-rate-
based stabilization program supplemented by fiscal adjustment and structural reforms 
measures involving agricultural reform, pension reform, fiscal measurement and 
transparency, and tax policy and administration. There were also measures to   3 
strengthen and regulate the banking sector. According to the new banking law, 
enacted in June 1999, and later modified in December 1999, an independent Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established. 
At the beginning, the 2000-2002 program was quite successful. Interest rates fell 
sharply below expected levels, inflation significantly slowed down, and production 
and domestic demand started to increase. Despite the fact that the program achieved 
some remarkable results in a short period of time, the 2000–2002 program had to be 
revised in light of the two successive liquidity and exchange-rate crises; first in 
November 2000, as a result of the extremely risky position of a medium-sized bank 
with large holdings of government securities in its portfolio, and then in February 
2001. The systemic banking crisis of late 2000, hand in hand with a deepening 
recession, resulted in a sharp currency crisis. The government abandoned the 
crawling-peg regime under the original plan and floated the Turkish lira in February 
2001. Between 2000 and 2002, more than 2 billion persons lost their jobs in Turkey. 
The decline in employment in the banking sector amounted approximately to 47130 
persons, which made 29.3 percent of the number of employees as end of 2000. More 
than 32000 banking sector employees, which were mostly well-educated and well-
paid, become unemployed only in 2001. 
From Crisis to Recovery: Banking Sector Restructuring and Rehabilitation 
After the banking and currency crises in November 2000 and February 2001, the 
government initiated a comprehensive Banking Sector Restructuring and 
Rehabilitation Program, which aimed at (i)  strengthening the private banks, 
(ii) resolution of the banks transferred to SDIF by methods, such as merger, sale and 
liquidation, (iii)  operational and financial restructuring of state banks with the 
ultimate goal of privatization, and (iv)  developing the legal and institutional 
framework, which will increase supervision and audit in the sector and make the 
sector more effective and competitive. Implementation of this restructuring program 
imposed substantial burden on the economy and public finance, as experienced in 
other countries. Between 1997 and 2002, the SDIF took over 20 banks with more than 
37000 employees and succeeded to create new job places for more than 10000 in their 
new banks. The number of banks (incl. the banks under the SDIF) declined from 81 in 
1999 to 54 in 2002, while the number of bank branches dropped from 7691 to 6106 in 
the same period. Government officials estimate that Turkey has spent some USD 44 
billion (or 30 % of GDP) since 1997 to reform the banking sector, which suffers from 
inherent structural weaknesses. In February 2003, under the leadership of the BRSA, a 
coordination committee was formed with representatives of the Banks Association of 
Turkey (BAT), to ensure rapid implementation of New Capital Adequacy Agreement 
(Basel II), and capital adequacy arrangements, which are called CAD-3 under the EU 
legislation. 
Table 1 presents selected banking sector figures, which characterize the developments 
in the sector between 2001 and 2004. As end of 2004, the number of banks in Turkey 
is 48, and only one of them is currently under the control of the SDIF. Latest statistics 
of the BAT indicate now slight increases in the number of employees and branches, 
with respect to previous year. This improvement is in accordance with the recent 
development path of the BSF index in Figure 1. Indeed, the Turkish banking sector 
seems to be recovered from the 2000-2001 financial crisis.   4 
As also stated in the Letter of Intent of the Turkish Government to the IMF on July 
15, 2004, however, the Government’s efforts to strengthen the financial system 
continue to move ahead across several fronts. The limited deposit guarantee system is 
put into effect on 5 July 2004. In summer 2004, the Government has completed a 
comprehensive review of the banking act to bring the legal framework more closely in 
line with EU standards. As of mid of February 2005, the new draft Banking Law 
seems to be ready to submit to the Turkish Parliament by the Government. The 
Government is committed to maintain the operational and financial independence of 
the BRSA and the SDIF in the new banking act and other relevant legislation. 
Furthermore, the loan portfolio of the banking sector is revised and the non-
performing loans (NPLs) are classified in compliance with international standards, 
and necessary provisions are allocated. Significant progress has been achieved with 
Istanbul Approach, which is a voluntary debt restructuring mechanism of the banks, 
developed to accelerate settlement of bad loans. As of September 2004, an agreement 
was reached with 295 out of 327 companies covered under the Approach, and 5.7 
billion dollars of debt was restructured, which allowed these companies to continue 
their economic activities. The ratio of NPLs to the gross loans decreased to 6.3 % in 
June 2004 from 29.3 % in December 2001 (Republic of Turkey, 2004).  
Looking into the Future: EU-Convergence and Banking Sector in Turkey 
Last December the EU decided to start accession talks with Turkey on 3
rd October 
2005. During the accession negotiations, which may last more than ten years, Turkey 
will experience significant economic and structural changes before joining the EU. 
She will take over and apply the whole body of EU legislation and standards, the 
Acquis Communautaire, upon accession at the latest. 
On December 14, 2004, Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, the IMF Managing Director, stated in 
his press release on Turkey (No. 04/265) that “in the banking sector, the goal over the 
next three years will be to align Turkey’s supervisory framework more closely with 
EU standards, accelerate resolution of assets held by the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund, and strengthen further the operations of the state banks. A key first step will be 
the introduction of a new financial services law that will upgrade rules relating to 
bank owners and managers, licensing, and related party lending, and allow the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency to coordinate on-site and off-site 
inspection more effectively.” 
Recent estimations of Deutsche Bank, moreover, show that the Turkish banking sector 
in particular stands to benefit from the increasing macroeconomic stability, improving 
sovereign creditworthiness, higher economic growth, increasing domestic savings and 
EU-related institutional reforms during the EU-convergence process within the 
coming 10 to 15 years, and the sector is likely to experience increased consolidation 
and foreign competition (see Jaeger, 2005). If this scenario becomes true, then, the 
relatively underdeveloped structure of the banking sector, in which assets and loans 
represent a mere 70 percent and 20 percent of GDP, respectively, may finally be 
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Data Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, and the International Monetary Fund; author’s own 
calculations. Methodology: Kibritçioğlu (2003). 
Note: Turkish banking sector experienced several difficulties, as a result of their own excessive risk-taking behavior within the 
last 25 years. Figure 1 above shows a banking sector fragility (BSF) index developed by Kibritçioğlu (2003). In one version, 
BSF3, it measures the weighted average of month-to-month real changes in bank claims on the domestic private sector, foreign 
liabilities of banks, and bank deposits, which are accepted as indicators of credit risk, exchange-rate risk and liquidity risk, 
respectively. The BSF2 version then excludes changes in bank deposits. The difference between these two versions shows 
roughly the effect of bank withdrawals, which becomes small if deposit insurance exists. Applied to Turkey, Figure 1 shows an 
excessive risk-taking behavior prior to each of the banking crises, visible as a peak value of the BSF curve. Then, these periods 
of excessive risk-taking are followed by sharp falls in the BSF index. The periods in which the index is below –0.5 are entitled as 










Figure 2: Selected Indicators of the Banking Sector in Turkey (1961 – 2004) 
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Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations.   6 
Figure 3: Employment in the Turkish Banking Sector (1961 – 2004) 
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Main Indicators           
Assets (billion USD)  117.7 130.1 178.9 184.9  n.a. 
Loans (billion USD)  23.4 30.0 47.4 58.9 n.a. 
Deposits (billion USD)  76.6 84.4  111.3  115.1  n.a. 
Number of Banks  61  54  50  49  48 
Number of Branches  6908  6106  5966  6014  6106 
Number of Employees (thousands)  137.5  123.3  123.2  126.3  127.2 
Concentration Ratio (%) *  57.7  62.2  63.0  60.0  n.a. 
Performance Indicators           
Net Profit (billion USD)  -8.2 1.8 4.0 1.6  n.a. 
Return on Assets (%)  -7.0  1.4  2.2  0.9  n.a. 
Loans / Deposits Rate (%)  30.5  35.5  42.6  51.2  n.a. 
Risks          
Capital Adequacy Ratio (%)  20.8  26.1  30.9  25.4  n.a. 
Foreign Exchange Position (billion USD) -1.6  -0.6  -0.0 -1.1  n.a. 
Non-Performing Loans / Gross Loans (%)  29.3  17.6  11.5  6.3  n.a. 
Securities Portfolio / Assets (%)  35.0  40.5  42.8 41.5  n.a. 
Memo Item: GDP (billion USD)  145.6 184.1 239.8   299.3 ** 
 
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) and Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
*  The share of five largest banks in total assets. 
**  Estimation for the year of 2004.   7 
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